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Most of us frequently engage in online communications, and our 
digitally stored property has largely replaced boxes of letters and photo 
albums that were once stashed in the attic. As the types and 
complexity of digital property grow, questions regarding the transfer 
and disposition of such items have intensified as well. Despite the 
prevalent usage of digital technology, the law has not entirely kept 
pace with the rapid creation of new methods that we use to 
communicate and store content. Dealing with digital property after the 
account owner’s death has emerged as an important issue for state 
legislatures, online service providers, and the family members of those 
individuals who maintain an online presence.  
 
The term “digital assets” broadly refers to accounts, documents, 
information, records, and photos that are accessible via an electronic 
device. Transactions involving digital assets are governed by a 
complex set of federal and state laws, as well as the private contractual 
agreements between the online service provider and the account 
holder. In an attempt to provide some guidance for fiduciaries who 
deal with digital assets, the Uniform Law Commission approved the 
Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
(“RUFADAA”) in 2015. RUFADAA seeks to apply existing laws 
governing fiduciaries to this new and increasingly popular form of 
property.  
 
The Uniform Law Commission addressed many of the difficulties 
encountered by an executor administering the estate of a deceased 
account holder. Certain provisions of RUFADAA, however, reinforce 
the online service provider’s ability to dictate what happens to digital 
assets after a person dies. This article will outline the framework of 
RUFADAA and summarize its key provisions, focusing on the 
disposition of electronic records and other digital files of a deceased 
account holder. It will examine whether a property interest exists in 
digital assets and if it is capable of being inherited and will describe 
the typical provisions contained in terms of service agreements that 
validate ownership rights in digital property. The article will explore 
the meaning of “disclosure” for purposes of RUFADAA and explain 
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how the lack of clearly defined fiduciary powers creates uncertainty 
for those attempting to marshal the digital property of a deceased 
account holder. The article will examine the instances when a court 
order is required before a fiduciary may gain access to the digital 
assets of a deceased person. Then it will address whether RUFADAA 
affords online service providers too much discretion to decide when a 
court order is warranted. Lastly, the article will discuss whether forum 
selection and choice of law provisions contained in standard terms of 
service agreements should be enforceable against a fiduciary acting on 
behalf of a deceased account holder’s estate.  
 
II. EXISTING FEDERAL LAWS DEALING WITH DIGITAL 
ASSETS  
 
Nearly seven in ten Americans use social media to connect with one 
another,1 and over 95% own a smartphone.2 According to one survey 
conducted by McAfee, almost 51% of consumers spend 15 hours or 
more on their digital devices for personal use each week,3 and, on 
average, we have over $35,000 worth of assets stored on these 
devices.4 There is no single definition of what is considered a “digital 
asset,” but the term has been broadly interpreted to include email 
accounts, text messages, social networking accounts (such as 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and Twitter), online credit card and banking 
accounts, photographs and videos stored online, photo and video 
sharing accounts (such as Instagram and YouTube), documents, cloud 
storage accounts (such as Dropbox, iCloud, and Microsoft OneDrive), 





1 Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY 
(June 12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media 
[https://perma.cc/K2TC-73CD]. 
2 Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: INTERNET AND TECHNOLOGY (June 
12, 2019), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile [https://perma.cc/9CNR-
5AE3]. 
3 How Do Your Digital Assets Compare?, MCAFEE: BLOG (May 14, 2013), 
https://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/digital-assets/ [https://perma.cc/3UDL-XCBL]. 
4 Id. A 2012 Wall Street Journal article found that Americans valued their digital 
assets at $55,000. Kelly Greene, Passing Down Digital Assets, Wall St. J. (Aug. 31, 
2012, 8:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000087239639044371370457760 
1524091363102 [https://perma.cc/TC2Z-7L7S]. 
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domain names, blogs, web pages, virtual currencies (such as Bitcoin), 
and hotel and airline mileage awards and points.5 Stated more 
concisely, digital assets are electronic records in which an individual 
has a right or interest, but not the underlying asset or liability unless 
the asset or liability is itself an electronic record.6 
 
Whatever definition is used, the growing presence of technology and 
electronic devices in our daily lives has led to important questions 
regarding the creation, transfer, and inheritability of digital property. 
The large amount of information kept in password-protected online 
accounts creates unique challenges for fiduciaries. During a person’s 
lifetime, access to digital assets is primarily governed by the terms of 
service agreement between the account holder and the company that 
stores the information on their server. When the account holder dies, 
however, federal and state laws pose legal obstacles for an executor or 
personal representative seeking to gain access to the decedent’s online 
accounts in order to manage the underlying property stored there in 
fulfillment of their fiduciary obligations. 
  
Existing federal and state laws are primarily aimed at protecting the 
user’s privacy and preventing misuse of digital assets by third parties. 
The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”),7 a component of the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act,8 prohibits an electronic 
communication service or a remote computing service from knowingly 
divulging the contents of a communication that is stored by, carried 
by, or maintained by that service.9 The SCA provides that it is a 





5 See Matthew D. Glennon, Note, A Call to Action: Why the Connecticut Legislature 
Should Solve the Digital Asset Dilemma, 28 QUINNIPIAC. PROB. L.J. 48, 53 (2014); 
Kristina Sherry, Comment, What Happens to Our Facebook Accounts When We 
Die?: Probate Versus Policy and the Fate of Social-Media Assets Postmortem, 40 
PEPP. L. REV. 185, 193-94 (2012). 
6 REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL ASSETS ACT § 2(10) (Unif. L. 
Comm’n, 2015) [hereinafter RUFADAA]. 
7 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-12 (2012).  
8 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 
1848 (2012) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22, 2701-12, 3121-27). 
9 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). 
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authorization a facility through which an electronic communication 
service is provided.”10 One exception under the SCA permits the 
provider to divulge the contents of a communication “with the lawful 
consent of the originator or an addressee or intended recipient of such 
communication, or the subscriber in the case of remote computing 
service.”11 The SCA protects the “contents” of a communication but 
does not apply to non-content information records such as the user’s 
name and address, network IP address, or addressee’s name and 
address.12 
 
Another federal law governing digital assets is the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), which prohibits “unauthorized access to 
computers.” 13 For purposes of the CFAA, unauthorized access 
technically occurs when any person other than the account owner 
accesses the online account in violation of the access rules set forth in 
a provider’s terms of service agreement.14 The CFAA does not contain 
a specific exemption for fiduciaries, so an executor who uses the 
deceased user’s password to gain access to an account may be in 
violation of federal law. In addition to the difficulties fiduciaries may 
encounter under federal law, all fifty states have enacted anti-hacking 
statutes that prohibit unauthorized access to another’s computer 
systems.15  
 
III. REVISED UNIFORM FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIGITAL 
ASSETS ACT 
 
The Uniform Law Commission recognized the need to address 
fiduciary access to digital assets and formed a drafting committee in 





10 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a) (2012). 
11 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3) (2012). 
12 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2012).  
13 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012). 
14 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
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governing fiduciaries to digital assets. The drafting committee sought 
to balance the fiduciary’s responsibility to manage digital property on 
behalf of a deceased person against the online service providers’ desire 
to protect the privacy interests of their account holders. After multiple 
revisions, the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
(“UFADAA”) was approved by the Uniform Law Commission in July 
2014.16 According to its default provisions, UFADAA granted 
fiduciaries broad access to digital accounts absent a clear prohibition 
by the decedent. Following approval of the model act, legislation to 
adopt UFADAA was introduced in multiple states. Ultimately, 
however, Delaware became the only state to adopt a version of 
UFADAA.17 Legislation in other states was blocked by a coalition of 
Internet service providers and privacy advocates who objected 
primarily to UFADAA’s default provisions granting fiduciaries broad 
access to the personal information of the deceased account owner.18 
Even after UFADAA’s approval in Delaware, Google, AOL, Net 
Choice and others strongly urged Delaware’s governor to veto the 
legislation, claiming that it “removes privacy protections for Delaware 
citizens, overrides user privacy choices, sets the privacy of Delaware 
residents lower than the federal standard, forces businesses to choose 
between violating a state law and risking violating a federal one, and 
ignores contract provisions long respected by the state.”19 
 
In response to the criticism aimed at UFADAA, the Uniform Law 
Commission reconvened and produced a revised version of UFADAA, 





16 Access to Digital Assets of Decedents, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures 
(May 23, 2019) https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-
technology/access-to-digital-assets-of-decedents.aspx [https://perma.cc/MS5V-
FSA3] [hereinafter “UFADAA”]. 
17 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2019). 
18 Morgan M. Weiner, Opposition to the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets 
Act, NAT’L L. REV. (Jul. 21, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/opposition-
to-uniform-fiduciary-access-to-digital-assets-act [https://perma.cc/4J4U-FNSZ]. 
19 Letter from NetChoice to Delaware Governor Jack Markell (July 8, 2014), 
http://netchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/Industry-Veto-Request-of-DE-HB-345-
Signed.pdf. 
20 RUFADAA § 2(10). 
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Virgin Islands have adopted RUFADAA. 21 Similar legislation has 
been proposed in four additional states, leaving Delaware, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, and Oklahoma as the only states that have yet to undertake 
action to introduce RUFADAA.22 The basic framework of RUFADAA 
enables fiduciaries such as executors or administrators, court-
appointed guardians or conservators, agents appointed under powers of 
attorney and trustees, to access online accounts after the account 
owner dies or loses the ability to manage the account.23  
 
Some key definitions are helpful in understanding the basic provisions 
of RUFADAA. A “user”24 maintains an account with a “custodian” 25 
who carries, maintains, processes, retrieves, or stores electronic data. 
The terms of service agreement, sometimes referred to as the user 
agreement or terms of use agreement, contains the set of rules and 
provisions that control the relationship between a user and a 
custodian.26 An “online tool” is an electronic service provided by a 
custodian, separate from the terms of service agreement, that allows a 
user to provide directions for disclosure or nondisclosure of digital 
assets to a third person.27   
 
RUFADAA addresses the relationship between online tools, terms-of 
service-agreements, and other written records documenting the user’s 
instructions for access to digital assets by setting up a three-tier system 
for disclosure. First, if a custodian provides an online tool that allows 
the account owner to specify another who is allowed access to the 
digital assets or to direct the custodian to delete the digital assets after 
the account owner’s death, the user’s online instructions are legally 





21 Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act, Revised, Unif. L. Comm’n 
https://my.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=f7237fc 
4-74c2-4728-81c6-b39a91ecdf22 [https://perma.cc/3ACU-P8XA].  
22 Id.  
23 RUFADAA, §§ 2(10), (14). 
24 Id. § 2(26). 
25 Id. § 2(8). 
26 Id. § 2(24). 
27 Id. § 2(16). 
28 Id. § 4(a).  
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planning tool, or if the user declines to use one, the user may give 
legally enforceable instructions as to the disposition of the digital 
assets in a will, trust, power of attorney, or other written record.29 
Third, if the user has not provided direction either online or pursuant 
to a will or other written record, the terms of service agreement for the 
user’s account will determine fiduciary access to the user’s digital 
assets.30 In the event the terms of service agreement is silent as to 
fiduciary access, the default provisions of RUFADAA apply.31  
 
According to the provisions of RUFADAA, the user’s instructions in 
an online tool regarding account access take priority over any other 
instructions set forth in a will or any other written record. One 
example of an online tool is Google’s “Inactive Account Manager” 
that allows users to select a trusted contact, not necessarily a fiduciary, 
for Google to notify after a certain period of account inactivity.32 By 
responding to a series of online prompts, the user can select which of 
their Google accounts the trusted contact can access, and which 
accounts should be deleted. When the user has filled out Google’s 
online tool, the trusted contact will not receive the user’s password or 
login details but may be provided with a link to download data from 
the Google YouTube, Drive, and Mail accounts specified by the 
deceased user.33 Facebook also has its own online tool, which allows 
the user to choose a “Legacy Contact” to either maintain a 





29 Id. § 4(b). 
30 Id. § 4(c). 






32 About Google Inactive Account Manager, GOOGLE, https://support.google.co 
m/accounts/answer/3036546?hl=en [https://perma.cc/68PF-AZHC]. 
33 Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased User’s Account, GOOGLE ACCT. HELP, 
https://support.google.com/accounts/troubleshooter/6357590?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/TFN3-NDK4] . 
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account.34 Facebook’s online tool has limited benefit since the legacy 
contact must be another Facebook user.35  
 
RUFADAA identifies electronic communications as one subset of 
digital assets, and makes a distinction between the “content” of 
electronic communications and a “catalogue” of electronic 
communications.” The content of an electronic communication 
includes the subject line and body of email messages, text messages, 
instant messages, or social media posts that users send to a select 
group of people as opposed to the general public, and other electronic 
communication between private parties.36 A catalogue of electronic 
communications is essentially a list of communications showing the 
electronic addresses of the sender and recipient and the time and date 
of the communication.37 Because the content of a user’s electronic 
communications implicate federal law and privacy concerns, 
RUFADAA mirrors the provisions of the SCA. RUFADAA preserves 
the default provision of user privacy in electronic communications by 
requiring the user to affirmatively “opt in” and consent to the 
disclosure of the content of electronic communications through the use 
of an online tool, will or other written record.38  
 
Social media accounts are treated as containing the content of 
electronic communications for purposes of RUFADAA. A Facebook 
profile, for instance, can be used both as a vehicle for exchanging 
messages with other users and as a platform for storing photos, videos 
and other non-protected digital property.39 Instagram, which is owned 









36 RUFADAA, § 2(6) (A)-(C). 
37 Id. § 2(4). 
38 Id. § 4. 
39 Facebook Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://en-gb.facebook.com/legal/terms 
[https://perma.cc/Q937-7GAH]. 
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billion users.40 Instagram is primarily a photo and video sharing 
service where users can upload photos or videos to share with their 
followers or with a select group of friends, but users can also view, 
comment and like posts shared by their friends on Instagram.41 Courts 
have held that non-public postings on social media accounts are 
covered by the SCA,42 so, in those cases where a fiduciary seeks 
access to the social media accounts of a deceased user, the custodians 
may refuse such requests based on lack of user consent.43  
 
Digital assets that do not contain the content of electronic 
communications receive less protection, and RUFADAA plainly states 
that the custodian “shall disclose” the user’s catalogue of electronic 
communications and any other non-protected digital assets to a 
fiduciary.44 The Comment to Section 8 of RUFADAA emphasizes the 
mandatory nature of this disclosure requirement, explaining that 
“[s]ection 8 requires disclosure of all other digital assets, unless 
prohibited by the decedent or directed by the court, . . . [and] Section 8 





40 Ashley Carman, Instagram Now Has 1 Billion Users Worldwide, (June 20, 2018, 
2:02 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/20/17484420/instagram-users-one-
billion-count [https://perma.cc/2S6M-KLVQ]. 
41 What is Instagram, INSTAGRAM: HELP CTR., 
https://help.instagram.com/424737657584573 [https://perma.cc/PYS9-EJ67]. 
42 See Crispin v. Christian Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2010) 
(“With respect to webmail and private messaging, the court is satisfied that those 
forms of communications media are inherently private such that stored messages are 
not readily accessible to the general public.”); Ehling v. Monmouth-Ocean Hosp. 
Serv. Corp., 961 F. Supp. 2d 659, 669 (D. N. J. 2013) (finding that when a user 
configures a Facebook wall post to be inaccessible to the general public, the wall 
posts are configured to be private for purposes of the SCA); Viacom Int'l Inc. v. 
YouTube Inc., 253 F.R.D. 256, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50614, 87 U.S.P.Q.2D 
(BNA) 1170 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 2, 2008) (finding that the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act does not prevent disclosure of non-content data about 
private videos posted on YouTube).  
43 See generally In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296. 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005); 
Tracy Sears, Family, Lawmakers Push for Facebook Changes Following Son’s 
Suicide, WTVR (Jan. 8, 2013, 8:11 PM), https://wtvr.com/2013/01/08/legislation-
introduced-for-access-to-deceased-persons-digital-property/ [https://perma.cc/3QU5-
XXUM].  
44 RUFADAA § 8. 
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‘catalogue’ of electronic communications and other digital assets not 
protected by federal privacy law.”45  
 
In order to gain access to any of the deceased user’s digital assets, the 
fiduciary is required to send a request to the custodian, along with a 
certified copy of the user’s death certificate and the document granting 
fiduciary authority.46 In all cases, however, the custodian has the 
ability to request that the fiduciary obtain a court order finding that 
disclosure of the user’s digital assets is reasonably necessary for estate 
administration.47 RUFADAA makes it clear that fiduciaries dealing 
with digital assets are subject to the same duties that apply to the 
management of other assets,48 and that RUFADAA is designed to be 
an overlay statute that works in conjunction with a state’s existing 
laws on probate, guardianship, trusts, and powers of attorney.49 
Furthermore, RUFADAA also protects custodians from liability for 
any actions taken in accordance with its provisions.50  
 
IV. PROPERTY INTEREST IN DIGITAL ASSETS 
 
RUFADAA reflects the general consensus about one basic principle: 
digital assets are property.51 The notion that a user possesses a distinct 
property interest in underlying electronic records is supported by the 
custodians’ own terms of service agreements. The provisions in these 





45 RUFADAA § 8 cmt. 
46 RUFADAA §§ 7, 8. 
47 RUFADAA §§ 7(5)(D), 8(4)(D). 
48 RUFADAA § 15. 
49 RUFADAA § 17. 
50 RUFADAA § 16. 
51 See Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 84 N.E.3d 766, 780 (2017) (Grant, J., dissenting) 
(pointing out that Yahoo! had not disputed a lower court’s finding that the contents 
of an email account were the property of a deceased user’s estate.); Alberto B. 
Lopez, Article: Posthumous Privacy, Decedent Intent, and Post-Mortem Access to 
Digital Assets, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 183, 215 (2016). In addition, the Internal 
Revenue Service treats Bitcoin as property for federal taxation purposes. I.R.S. 
Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. (April 14, 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
drop/n-14-21.pdf.  
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user, such as photos, files, or documents, remains the property of the 
user. For example, Facebook’s terms of use policy provide that:  
 
You own the content you create and share on Facebook and the 
other Facebook Products you use, and nothing in these Terms 
takes away the rights you have to your own content. You are 
free to share your content with anyone else, wherever you 
want. To provide our services, though, we need you to give us 
some legal permissions to use that content.52  
 
Similar terms also apply to the photos, videos, and images stored on 
Instagram, which is owned by Facebook.53 Oath Holdings, Inc.,54 
which owns Yahoo Mail and Aol.com, states in their terms of service 
agreement that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the specific product 
terms or guidelines for one of our Services, when you upload, share 
with or submit content to the Services you retain ownership of any 
intellectual property rights that you hold in that content . . . .”55 
Google’s terms of service, which also cover YouTube and Google 
Drive accounts, provide that “[s]ome of our Services allow you to 
upload, submit, store, send or receive content. You retain ownership of 
any intellectual property rights that you hold in that content. In short, 
what belongs to you stays yours.”56 The terms of service for Dropbox 
state that “[w]hen you use our Services, you provide us with things 
like your files, content, messages, contacts and so on ("Your Stuff"). 





52 Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php 
[https://perma.cc/S9WM-H4QM].  
53 Instagram’s terms of use provide as follows: “We do not claim ownership of your 
content that you post on or through the Service.” Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, 
https://help.instagram.com/581066165581870 [https://perma.cc.PL97-L5T3]. 
54 Oath was renamed Verizon Media effective January 8, 2019. See Todd Spangler, 
Verizon is Officially Killing the Oath Name (December 18, 2018), 
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/verizon-officially-killing-oath-name-
011702437.html [https://perma.cc/6ZFJ-QK96]. 
55 Terms of Service, OATH, https://policies.oath.com/us/en/oath/terms/otos/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/BZ6M-JAMB]. 
56 Content in Google Services, GOOGLE: TERMS OF SERVICE, 
https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=en-US#toc-content [https://perma.cc/9LMV-
T6GY]. 
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Stuff except for the limited rights that enable us to offer the 
Services.”57  
 
These declarations by custodians acknowledging the user’s ownership 
rights to the items stored online are based primarily on the protectable 
copyright interest of the creator.58 Copyright protection exists “in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or 
with the aid of a machine or device.”59 Written documents stored on 
Google Drive or Dropbox, for example, and any videos, photos, or 
images uploaded by the user to Google Photos or YouTube satisfy the 
requirement of a fixed medium of expression necessary for copyright 
protection.60 As the author or creator of the material, ownership of the 
copyright vests in the user regardless of where their content is posted 
or stored.61 For purposes of inheritability, basic principles of probate 
law provide that a separate intangible property interest in the copyright 
itself can be passed under a will or a state’s intestate succession laws.62 
So, when an account owner dies, the physical computer, phone, or 
hard drive along with any videos, documents, and photos stored on the 
devices would pass as tangible property, but the copyright to the stored 
content would pass separately to the heirs.63 
 
While the user maintains a property interest in their digital assets, the 
custodian maintains control over the account where the digital 





57 Terms of Service, DROPBOX (DEC. 8, 2016), https://www.dropbox.com/terms2016 
[https://perma.cc/R6HD-BAK3]. 
58 Lopez, supra note 51, at 215.  
59 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
60 Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns A Decedent’s E-Mails: 
Inheritable Probate Assets or Property Of The Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL'Y 281, 288 (2007).  
61 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2012). 
62 Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 60, at 286-87.   
63 Natalie M. Banta, Death and Privacy in the Digital Age, 94 N.C. L. REV. 927, 988 
(2016).  
64 Ashley F. Watkins, Digital Properties and Death: What Will Your Heirs Have 
Access to After You Die?, 62 BUFFALO L. REV. 193, 216 (2014). 
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provisions prohibiting the transfer of rights in the account upon the 
death of the user and permitting a custodian to delete the account at 
any time. For instance, Section 3 of Oath’s terms of service agreement 
provide “all Oath accounts are non-transferable, and any rights to them 
terminate upon the account holder’s death.”65 If a user has not yet 
agreed to the new terms of service with Oath, Yahoo’s “legacy” terms 
of service apply and state that:  
 
No Right of Survivorship and Non-Transferability. You agree 
that your Yahoo account is non-transferable and any rights to 
your Yahoo ID or contents within your account terminate upon 
your death. Upon receipt of a copy of a death certificate, your 
account may be terminated and all contents therein 
permanently deleted.66   
 
Under its Account Help section, Google states, “[w]e can work with 
immediate family members and representatives to close the account of 
a deceased person where appropriate. In certain circumstances we may 
provide content from a deceased user's account.”67 The terms of 
service agreement for Dropbox contain similar prohibitions against 
assignment of the agreement, and a statement that the terms create no 
third party beneficiary rights.68 Section 4 of Facebook’s terms of 
service similarly declare “[y]ou will not transfer any of your rights or 
obligations under these Terms to anyone else without our consent.”69 
 
Statements prohibiting the transfer or assignment of the user’s account 
are seemingly at odds with the other statements in the terms of service 





65 OATH, supra note 55.  
66 Terms of Service, YAHOO, 
https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.htm (click on the “legacy 
Yahoo Terms of Service” hyperlink; then click the hyperlink for “Yahoo Terms”) 
(last visited Apr. 23, 2020). 
67 Submit a Request Regarding a Deceased User's Account, GOOGLE: ACCT HELP, 
https://support.google.com/accounts/troubleshooter/6357590?hl=en 
[https://perma.cc/QJE7-C9SM]. 
68 DROPBOX, supra note 57.   
69 FACEBOOK, supra note 52.  
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material. Provisions that permit the custodian to terminate all control 
and rights of access to the user’s account, and possibly even delete the 
contents, are valid only if there is no underlying property interest 
capable of being transferred, which contradicts the custodians’ own 
declarations.70 A user’s heirs theoretically have a separate, underlying 
property interest in decedent’s digital assets, based on copyright law, 
that can be passed pursuant to a will or a state’s intestate succession 
laws. Even if the user does not explicitly mention digital assets in the 
will, all professionally drafted wills have a residuary clause which 
transmits any items, such as digital assets, not specifically mentioned 
to named beneficiaries.71 Likewise, when a user dies without a valid 
will, the intestacy scheme distributes all assets to the heirs.72 An estate 
fiduciary has an obligation to marshal all of the decedent’s assets 
wherever they are located. This obligation extends to any digital 
property owned by the user but controlled by a custodian, 
notwithstanding statements to the contrary contained in the terms of 
service agreement.  
 
V. INHERITING DIGITAL ASSETS AFTER RUFADAA: 
WHAT ISSUES REMAIN? 
 
While RUFADAA resolves many questions surrounding fiduciary 
access to digital assets, digital property continues to be a focus area in 
estate litigation. There is scant case law interpreting RUFADAA, but a 
few recent court decisions and related commentaries highlight the 
lingering issues that confront a fiduciary seeking access to the digital 
assets of a deceased user.73 One problem is that, absent clear language 
in RUFADAA describing what actions the fiduciary may take with 
respect to digital assets, the scope of fiduciary powers to control or 
manage digital property after the user’s death remains unclear. In 
addition, RUFADAA is structured so that custodians have complete 





70 Natalie M. Banta, Property Interests in Digital Assets: The Rise of Digital 
Feudalism, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1099, 1131 (2017). 
71 David Horton, Contractual Indescendibility, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1047, 1052 (2015). 
72 Id. 
73 See, e.g., E. Edwin Eck, Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act 
and Its Impact on Estate Planning, 43 MONT. LAW. 20 (2017). 
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receiving access to the decedent’s digital assets, which, in practice, 
may lead to court orders becoming a de facto requirement. RUFADAA 
also allows the custodian to select the manner of disclosure regarding 
digital assets, leading to further administrative delays in the settlement 
of an estate. Finally, custodians continue to include forum selection 
and choice of law provisions in their terms of service agreements in an 
attempt to override well-settled probate law that prioritizes the laws of 
the decedent’s domicile in matters related to estate administration.   
  
a. Fiduciary Powers Not Cleary Defined  
 
RUFADAA leaves open the question of how much authority a 
fiduciary actually possesses with respect to the decedent’s digital 
assets. The current language in RUFADAA requires the custodian to 
“disclose” information to the fiduciary about the user’s digital assets, 
without specifically granting the fiduciary any accompanying powers 
to engage in transactions with the property. Notably, under the 
statutory scheme of UFADAA, fiduciaries originally had the ability to 
“access” the digital assets of the decedent.74 The Uniform Law 
Commission acknowledged that one of the reasons that custodians 
were reluctant to embrace UFADAA in its initial form was their 
concern that the term “access” could be interpreted differently by 
various constituencies.75 The Uniform Law Commission changed the 
terminology from granting a fiduciary “access” under UFADAA to 
providing a fiduciary with “disclosure” about the assets under 
RUFADAA, explaining the reasoning for the change as follows:  
 
Fiduciaries need access to information contained in 
online accounts, but not necessarily to the account 
itself. Internet firms expressed concern that the 
language of UFADAA required them to allow a 





74 UFADAA § 8. 
75 Proposed Changes to the Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Access Act, Unif. L. 
Comm’n (2015), https://www.uniformlaws.org/HigherLogic/System/Download 
DocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=6cdd65e9-e4ee-3791-2132-
7f4223fb6cef&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/AZ2K-84UY]. 
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attendant risk that full access was neither intended, nor 
necessary. The proposed amendments clarify that 
disclosure of information is what RUFADAA requires, 
and new Section 6(a) provides the custodians of digital 
assets with a choice of how to disclose the requested 
information.76  
 
Even though RUFADAA now entitles a fiduciary to disclosure rather 
than access to the digital assets of the decedent, inconsistent 
terminology is used in various parts of RUFADAA to explain the 
fiduciary’s powers. For instance, the Prefatory Note states that the 
purpose of RUFADAA is to give fiduciaries the legal authority to 
manage digital assets in the same way they manage tangible assets.77 
In the body of RUFADAA, although Section 8 is titled “Disclosure of 
Digital Assets of a Deceased User,” the official comment to the section 
provides that “[s]ection 8 was intended to give personal 
representatives default access to the ‘catalogue’ of electronic 
communications and other digital assets not protected by federal 
privacy law.”78 RUFADAA concludes by referring to a fiduciary’s 
power to manage digital assets, as one of the final provisions of 
RUFADAA states that “[t]he legal duties imposed on a fiduciary 
charged with managing tangible property apply to the management of 
digital assets, including: (1) the duty of care; (2) the duty of loyalty; 
and (3) the duty of confidentiality.”79  
 
The variable use of imprecisely defined terms, such as “access,” 
“disclosure,” and “manage,” across different parts of RUFADAA 
creates ambiguity as to the exact scope of fiduciary authority with 
respect to a deceased user’s digital assets, which may be intentional. 
According to Suzanne B. Walsh, who chaired the drafting commission 
for RUFADAA, the term “access” was purposely not defined in 





76 Id.  
77 RUFADAA Prefatory Note (emphasis added). 
78 RUFADAA, § 8 cmt. (emphasis added). 
79 RUFADAA, § 15(a) (emphasis added). 
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the type of digital asset involved.80 Utilizing this approach, and 
delineating fiduciary powers based on the character of the underlying 
asset, means that fiduciary authority should be more expansive when 
the custodian possesses non-content, non-protected digital assets of a 
deceased user. Under RUFADAA, the content of any electronic 
communications is accessible to a fiduciary only when 1) the user 
consents to such disclosure and 2) the fiduciary authority in this 
situation is spelled out by the user in the online tool, will, or other 
written directive.81 Disclosure of any non-protected digital assets, on 
the other hand, is mandated under RUFADAA and fiduciaries are 
granted “default access” to these assets of the decedent.82 In order to 
give full effect to this default provision and make non-protected assets 
automatically available to the fiduciary, a fiduciary’s authority over 
non-protected digital property should be interpreted more broadly. A 
fiduciary should be able to take possession of, control, manage, use, 
distribute, transfer, or otherwise dispose of any digital assets of a 
deceased user not subject to protections under federal privacy laws.   
 
Broader fiduciary authority over non-protected digital assets is implied 
in RUFADAA, and the fiduciary’s power to conduct transactions in 
this type of property should be more clearly aligned with the 
customary actions a fiduciary may take with respect to estate property 
in general, namely the power to retain assets, receive assets, and 
acquire or dispose of assets.83 Once it is established that the digital 
property held by the custodian constitutes non-protected digital assets, 
the fiduciary should be allowed to collect, use, manage, control, 
transfer, and even dispose of the property. The custodian’s own 
statements acknowledge that the contents of the user’s account are the 
user’s property, but without the ability to marshal and collect the 






80 Suzanne B. Walsh, Coming Soon To A Legislature Near You: Comprehensive 
State Law Governing Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
429, 445 (2014). 
81 RUFADAA § 4.  
82 RUFADAA § 8 cmt. 
83 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-715(1)-(2), (5)-(6), (11) (1969) (amended 2010). 
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The language in RUFADAA should be revised to make it clear that, at 
least with respect to non-protected digital property, a fiduciary is 
permitted to collect and manage these assets in the same manner as 
other estate property.84 Section 8 of RUFADAA, which contains the 
default provision covering non-protected digital assets, currently states 
that “a custodian shall disclose”85 information about these assets to the 
personal representative of the estate of a deceased user.86 This 
language can be supplemented with an additional statement to make it 
clear that a fiduciary may also access, transfer, copy, or even dispose 
of any non-protected digital assets or digital account.87 Without a 
corresponding right to retrieve the non-protected digital assets, the 
default provision of RUFADAA is virtually meaningless. Delaware’s 
version of RUFADAA explicitly states that a “fiduciary may exercise 
control over any and all rights in digital assets and digital accounts of 
an account holder,”88 and that if any provision in a terms of service 
agreement “limits a fiduciary’s access to or control over a digital asset 
or digital account of an account holder, the provision is void as against 
the strong public policy of this State . . .”89 Similar language can be 
adopted by other states to clarify that fiduciary authority over non-
protected digital assets extends beyond merely receiving disclosure 
about the existence of such assets. This additional statutory language 
will operate as a safeguard to prevent custodians from enforcing non-
transferability provisions contained in their terms of service 
agreements against a fiduciary seeking to obtain control over non-
protected digital assets from the custodian.  
 
b. Custodian’s Discretion To Require A Court Order 
 
In its current form, RUFADAA permits a custodian to insist that a 





84 REV. UNIF. FIDUCIARY ACCESS TO DIG. ASSETS ACT (2015), Summary Sept. 2017, 
supra note 31 (stating that “other types of digital assets are not communications, but 
intangible personal property”).  
85 RUFADAA § 8. 
86 RUFADAA § 8. 
87 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5005(b) (2019). 
88 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2019). 
89 Id. 
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deceased user’s digital assets are disclosed. The custodian can require 
a court order despite the deceased user’s explicit instructions, 
contained in a will, allowing disclosure of the contents of electronic 
communications,90 and even though the disclosure is mandated 
because the assets in question are non-protected.91 Requiring the 
fiduciary to seek a court order when the decedent has included a clear 
directive in a validly executed will is simply redundant, and there is no 
valid reason to request that a court re-examine explicit instructions 
contained in a will regarding the disposition of decedent’s property. 92 
It is particularly inappropriate for a custodian to routinely request court 
orders prior to the disclosure of any non-protected digital assets since 
RUFADAA mandates that the custodian provide this information to 
the fiduciary.93 To limit the unfettered discretion afforded custodians 
and to prevent possible abuse, RUFADAA should be revised to restrict 
the custodian’s ability to request a court order prior to disclosing non-
protected digital assets to unusual situations, such as when the 
ownership of the account must be verified.94  
 
Recent New York cases indicate that custodians will treat the court 
order as a de facto requirement for disclosure of non-protected digital 
assets to the fiduciary. In In re Estate of Serrano, the executor in a 
small New York estate proceeding asked that Google release the 
decedent’s contacts and calendar information so that the executor 
could inform friends of his passing and wind up any unfinished 
business.95 Prior to disclosing the information, Google instructed the 
executor to obtain a court order specifying that disclosure of the 
requested electronic information “would not violate any applicable 
laws, including but not limited to the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act and any state equivalent."96 In its decision, the court held 
that the requested information was not protected under New York’s 





90 RUFADAA§ 7(5)(C). 
91 RUFADAA § (4)(D). 
92 Lopez, supra note 51, at 235. 
93 RUFADAA § 8 (4)(D). 
94 Lopez, supra note 51, at 239. 
95 In re Estate of Serrano, 54 N.Y.S.3d 564, 565 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2017). 
96 Id.  
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about a user's contacts is ‘information that identifies each person with 
which a user has had an electronic communication, the time and date 
of the communication, and the electronic address of the person,’ it is 
considered a catalogue of electronic communication.”97 The court 
found that since no transfer of information between two parties occurs 
when a calendar entry is made, a user’s calendar is not an electronic 
communication but rather a non-protected digital asset.98 The court 
directed Google to disclose the calendar and contact information to the 
executor, declaring that “disclosure of the requested non-content 
information is permitted, if not mandated, by article 13-A of the 
EPTL and does not violate the ECPA.”99 
 
In another recent case, a Broadway executive died unexpectedly and 
his husband sought access to his spouse’s iCloud account with Apple, 
Inc. so that he could retrieve family photos stored online.100 Apple 
refused to provide the executor with access to his husband’s photo 
account without a court order, so he filed a request for access with the 
Manhattan Surrogate’s Court.101 The court noted that the decedent had 
not granted his executor access to his digital assets through an online 
tool, or pursuant to a provision in his will or any other written 
document.102 The court observed, however, that “decedent's 
photographs stored in his Apple account are clearly not ‘electronic 
communications,’ the disclosure of which, in the absence of a court 
order, requires consent of the account holder in any form listed 
under EPTL 13-A-2.2.”103 As a result, Apple was required to grant 
access to the photographs since no lawful consent was required 
pursuant to the SCA. The court noted that decedent’s property includes 
“assets kept in a digital form in cyberspace” and that New York’s 
version of RUFADAA was enacted “to apply traditional laws 







99 Id. (emphasis added). 
100 In re Scandalios, 2019 WL 266570 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2019). 
101 Id. at 2. 
102 Id. at 3. 
103 Id.  
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fiduciaries to "gain access to, manage, distribute and copy or delete 
digital assets."104 
 
A fairly routine application of New York’s version of RUFADAA also 
occurred where an executor was denied access to the decedent’s email 
account with Google.105 The decedent had not activated Google’s 
online tool and did not address the disclosure of such assets in a will or 
other record, so Google refused to provide the executor with access to 
the content of decedent’s email account.106 In its decision denying the 
executor’s request, the court stated that:  
 
Although no one has appeared in opposition to the requested 
relief, in this evolving area, the undersigned is concerned that 
unfettered access to a decedent’s digital assets may result in an 
unanticipated intrusion into the personal affairs of the decedent 
or disclosure of sensitive or confidential data, for example, 
information unrelated to his business or corporation. Thus, the 
court must balance the fiduciary’s duty to properly administer 
this estate, while avoiding the possibility of unintended 
consequences.107  
 
The court directed Google to disclose only the contact information 
stored and associated with the account and noted that a separate 
application could be made to expand the authority to include the 
content of the electronic communications in the event greater access to 
the account was warranted.108 While it is not entirely clear from the 
facts of this case, it does not appear that Google responded to the 
executor’s initial request with an offer to provide a catalogue of 
decedent’s electronic communications. Providing the executor with the 
mandated non-content information would have indicated a willingness 





104 Id.  
105 In re Estate. of White, 2017 WL 8944064, 1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2017). 
106 Id.  
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
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exercised its right under RUFADAA to insist on a court order, but then 
did not even appear in court to defend its position.109  
 
A custodian’s unilateral right to demand a court order prior to the 
disclosure of all digital assets places an unfair burden on personal 
representatives, as well as the courts. There is an incentive for a 
custodian to insist that a fiduciary seek a court order prior to the 
disclosure of digital assets since it provides a relatively simple way for 
the custodian to protect against liability for improper disclosure, while 
at the same time shifting the administrative burden and cost for this 
protection to the deceased user’s estate. In small estate proceedings, 
this burden may be especially significant and have a chilling effect. 
When a fiduciary utilizes the summary estate proceedings to settle a 
small estate, there is little incentive to hire an estate attorney for the 
sole reason of obtaining a court order to access digital assets that most 
likely hold sentimental, rather than monetary, value. The custodian’s 
complete discretion to require a court order, even prior to the 
disclosure of non-protected digital assets, is particularly troubling 
since disclosure of these assets is mandatory under RUFADAA. As 
seen in both Serrano and Scandalios, the custodian can refuse to 
provide information about non-protected assets based on the SCA and 
privacy concerns, even though these objections do not apply to non-
protected assets, then wait to see whether the fiduciary will actually 
seek the court order. Compounding the problem of unfettered 
discretion to require a court order is the custodian’s freedom to choose 
among three levels of disclosure, which may lead to further 
unnecessary delays in the administration of an estate. A custodian 
providing information about the deceased user’s digital assets may 
elect to provide full access, partial access, or to provide a “data 
dump.”110 Under the existing framework of RUFADAA, it is possible 
for the custodian to insist on a court order prior to disclosing non-






110 RUFADAA § 6(a). 
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partial access, but then the fiduciary may need to return to court to 
obtain full access.111  
 
Custodians currently can treat the court order as an additional 
requirement for a fiduciary seeking disclosure of mandated 
information, which surely was not the intention when RUFADAA was 
approved. 112 RUFADAA makes it clear that access to the non-
protected digital assets of the decedent should be routine.113 The 
language of RUFADAA should be revised to curb a custodian’s 
discretion to request court orders for disclosure of non-protected 
digital assets to unusual circumstances, such as when the ownership of 
the account must be verified.114 If this loophole is not closed, court 
orders may become a mandatory requirement for disclosure of any 
type of digital assets. In addition, the estate fiduciary, rather than the 
custodian, should be able to determine the extent and manner of 
disclosure based on the needs of a particular estate administration, 
placing the burden on the custodian to justify any refusal to comply 
with the executor’s request.   
 
c. Enforceability of Forum Selection and Choice of Law 
Provisions 
 
Prior to creating an online account, a user must agree to the 
custodian’s terms and conditions governing access to the account 
where the digital assets will be stored. These terms of service 
agreements, generally drafted in a manner that is advantageous to the 





111 Elizabeth Sy, Comment: The Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets 
Act: Has the Law Caught Up With Technology?, 32 TOURO L. REV. 647, 675 (2016). 
112 See Renee R. Roth & Daniel G. Fish, Access by Fiduciaries to Digital Assets, 
NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL (Feb. 20, 2018), http://www.mclaughlinstern.com/docs/ 
publications/NYLJ_Access_by_Fiduciaries_to_Digital_Assets.pdf. 
113 See RUFADAA § 8 cmt. (“Section 8 was intended to give personal 
representatives default access to the “catalogue” of electronic communications and 
other digital assets not protected by federal privacy law.”). 
114 Lopez, supra note 51, at 239. 
115 Black’s Law Dictionary defines the adhesion contract, or contract of adhesion, as 
a “[s]tandardized contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on 
essentially ‘take it or leave it’ basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity 
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distinguished between two forms of online contracts of adhesion based 
on the method in which the user agrees to the terms. A “click-wrap” 
agreement typically requires the user to click an “I agree” box after 
being presented with the terms.116 A "browse-wrap" agreement is one 
"where website terms and conditions of use are posted on the website 
typically as a hyperlink at the bottom of the screen."117 Click-wrap 
agreements are generally enforceable since the parties have 
constructive notice of the terms and make an affirmative act to agree to 
them by clicking "I agree."118 Browse-wrap agreements, on the 
contrary, are usually unenforceable because the terms are not 
conspicuous and the user must click a hyperlink to view the terms and 
does not need to view these terms to use the service.119 The Second 
Circuit has addressed the enforceability of terms in browse-wrap 
agreements and stated that "reasonably conspicuous notice of the 
existence of contract terms and unambiguous manifestation of assent 
to those terms by consumers are essential if electronic bargaining is to 
have integrity and credibility."120 The court further stated that a user is 
not expected to search for the terms and conditions when using a free 
online service because the transaction does not compare to "the paper 
world of arm's-length bargaining."121  
 
Even when the provisions contained in a terms of service agreement 
are reasonably communicated and accepted, and there is evidence that 
a user has affirmatively agreed to be bound by the provisions, a court 
 
to bargain and under such conditions that consumer cannot obtain desired product or 
services except by acquiescing in form contract. Distinctive feature of adhesion 
contract is that weaker party has no realistic choice as to its terms.” Contract of 
Adhesion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (10th ed. 2014).  
116 Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).  
117 Id.  
118 Joseph Ronderos, Is Access Enough?: Addressing Inheritability of Digital Assets 
Using the Three-Tier System Under the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital 
Assets Act, 18 TENN. J. BUS. L. 1031, 1054 (2017). 
119 Id. 
120 Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(declining to apply terms in a browse-wrap agreement); see also Hines, 668 F. Supp. 
2d at 366 (declining to enforce forum selection clause contained in a browse-wrap 
agreement). 
121 Specht, 306 F.3d at 32. 
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may look beyond mutual assent and find that the terms are 
unconscionable and should not be enforced. A two-part test for 
unconscionability has been successfully asserted by consumers 
seeking to avoid terms contained in a contract of adhesion.122 A user 
must first show that a term in an online contract is procedurally 
unconscionable, which usually means that it has been offered on a 
take-it-or-leave-it basis by a party with superior bargaining muscle, or 
it is buried in fine print.123 A provision must also be found to be 
substantively unconscionable, meaning that it is unfair, one-sided, or 
unreasonably favorable to the drafter.124  
 
When an adhesion contract contains a forum selection provision, 
courts will generally enforce the clause absent “a strong showing that: 
(1) the clause was the product of fraud or overreaching; (2) 
enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust; (3) proceedings in the 
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that the 
party challenging the clause will for all practical purposes be deprived 
of his day in court; or (4) enforcement would contravene a strong 
public policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared 
by statute or by judicial decision.”125 A court may, however, refuse to 
enforce a forum selection clause where the chosen state has no 
substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction, or 
where application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a 
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest 
than the chosen state in the determination of the particular issue.126 
The burden of proving that the forum selection clause is 
unconscionable rests with the party objecting to its enforcement. The 
Supreme Court has stated, “. . . it should be incumbent on the party 





122 Horton, supra note 71, at 1067. 
123 Horton, supra note 71, at 1067. 
124 Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972) (stating that a contract 
clause should be enforced absent a showing that “enforcement would be 
unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was invalid for such reasons as fraud or 
overreaching”).  
125 EMC Corp. v. Petter, 104 F. Supp. 3d 127 (D. Mass. 2015) (applying the test set 
forth in Bremen to an electronic restricted stock agreement). 
126 Id.  
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forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will for all 
practical purposes be deprived of his day in court. Absent that, there is 
no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or unreasonable 
to hold that party to his bargain.”127  
 
Custodians frequently include broadly worded provisions in their 
terms of service agreements,128 but if the question pertains to the 
probate or inheritability of digital assets the deceased user’s domicile 
has an overwhelming interest in adjudicating matters relating to the 
user’s estate property. It is well-settled probate law that the laws of the 
decedent’s domicile determine which court has proper jurisdiction to 
probate the will and administer the estate, 129 and the laws of the 
domicile also govern intestate distribution of assets in the event there 
is no will.130 In New York, domicile is defined by statute as that fixed, 
permanent and principal home to which a person wherever temporarily 
located always intends to return.131 In Florida, domicile means a 
person’s usual place of dwelling.132 While the exact definition of 





127 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 18. 
128 Facebook, for example, provides in its Terms of Service under 4. Disputes “[f]or 
any claim, cause of action, or dispute you have against us that arises out of or relates 
to these Terms or the Facebook Products ("claim"), you agree that it will be resolved 
exclusively in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California or a state 
court located in San Mateo County. You also agree to submit to the personal 
jurisdiction of either of these courts for the purpose of litigating any such claim, and 
that the laws of the State of California will govern these Terms and any claim, 
without regard to conflict of law provisions.” FACEBOOK, supra note 52. Google’s 
Terms of Service provides that the “laws of California, U.S.A., excluding 
California’s conflict of laws rules, will apply to any disputes arising out of or relating 
to these terms or the Services. All claims arising out of or relating to these terms or 
the Services will be litigated exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa Clara 
County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal jurisdiction in 
those courts.” GOOGLE, supra note 56. 
129 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-201 (1969) (amended 2010) (stating that the “[v]enue for 
the first informal or formal testacy or appointment proceedings after a decedent’s 
death is: (1) in the [county] where the decedent had his domicile at the time of his 
death . . .”). 
130 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-101 (1969) (amended 2010). 
131 N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT § 103(15) (1966). 
132 FLA. STAT. § 731.201(13) (2018). 
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same. Domicile is the “preeminent headquarters” that every person is 
compelled to have so that certain rights and duties may be 
determined.133 The selection of a particular location as one’s 
permanent home indicates, in part, a willingness to accept the 
privileges afforded by that state’s laws and a readiness to be subject to 
the obligations imposed by it.  
 
The laws of the decedent’s domicile may have significant financial 
implications for the estate as well. For example, California law grants 
surviving family members the right to control the name, likeness, 
voice and image of a deceased person for 70 years after death,134 while 
New York does not grant publicity rights. In 2012, the beneficiaries of 
the estate of Marilyn Monroe claimed that they inherited a right of 
publicity under California law even though Monroe’s executors had 
for forty years asserted in probate proceedings that her domicile was in 
New York.135 The Ninth Circuit held that Marilyn Monroe’s estate 
could not claim Monroe’s rights of publicity under California law 
because the estate had previously claimed in unrelated suits that she 
was domiciled in New York at the time of her death.136 The court 
stated that “[b]ecause Monroe died domiciled in New York, New York 
law applies to the question of whether Monroe LLC has the right to 
enforce Monroe's posthumous right of publicity. Because no such right 
exists under New York law, Monroe LLC did not inherit it through the 
residual clause of Monroe's will, and cannot enforce it . . . .”137  
 
Custodians attempt to override basic probate law through the inclusion 
of forum selection and choice of law clauses in their terms of service 





133 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 625 (1914). 
134 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering 2019); see also Fla. Stat. § 540.08 (2018) (in 
Florida the right of publicity extends for 40 years). 
135 Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 998 (9th 
Cir. 2012). 
136 Id.  
137 Id. at 1000. 
138 Natalie M. Banta, Article: Inherit the Cloud: The Role of Private Contracts in 
Distributing or Deleting Digital Assets at Death, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 799, 824-25 
(2014).  
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California will govern any disputes, and that all claims must be 
resolved in a state or federal court located in Santa Clara County, 
California.139 But the state of California is not likely to have any 
significant connection to the probate or intestate distribution of the 
digital property of their users unless the user is domiciled in 
California.140 Given that only a small percentage of all users are 
permanently situated in California, it is questionable whether these 
contractual terms would supersede the strong interest of the decedent's 
own domicile to settle the estate and resolve probate matters.  
 
A forum selection clause contained in a terms of service agreement 
was at issue in Ajemian v. Yahoo.141 John Ajemian died intestate in 
2006 and his siblings requested access to his email account from 
Yahoo! so that they could inform friends of his passing and identify 
his assets.142 Yahoo! declined the request on the grounds that such 
disclosure would violate the Stored Communications Act.143 The trial 
court in Massachusetts initially dismissed an action brought by the 
executor against Yahoo!, concluding that the forum selection clause in 
the terms of service agreement required the action to be brought in 
California, not Massachusetts.144 On appeal, the court concluded that 
Yahoo! had not carried its burden to demonstrate that the forum 
selection clause was reasonably communicated and accepted, and 





139 See Bremen, supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
140 Data collected by the custodian is unlikely to be physically stored in California 
since custodians operate multiple data warehouse facilities across the country. 
Google, for example, maintains data centers across the world but none are physically 
located in California. See GOOGLE DATA CENTERS, 
https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside 
/locations/index.html [https://perma.cc/CL8M-FL78]. Even if the data pertaining to 
the digital assets of a deceased user is physically stored in California, a fiduciary 
could gain authority over any digital assets located outside the state of decedent’s 
domicile through an ancillary probate proceeding. See UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. IV 
cmt. (1969) (amended 2010). 
141 Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 83 Mass. App. Ct. 565 (2013). 
142 Id. at 567. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 566.  
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declined to enforce the forum selection clause.145 The court noted that 
the deceased user was domiciled in Massachusetts at the time of his 
death and Yahoo! offered nothing to suggest that jurisdiction over the 
assets of his estate belonged anywhere other than Massachusetts.146 
The court added that nothing appeared to connect the estate assets to 
California. The administrators were residents of Massachusetts and 
were appointed by the Probate and Family Court in Massachusetts and 
Yahoo! was a Delaware corporation with a principal place of business 
in California.147 As a result, there was no relationship between the 
estate and the decedent’s email account to California that would make 
in rem jurisdiction over the emails reasonable in California.148 The 
court also noted that Yahoo! had not asserted that the California 
probate court would even entertain in rem jurisdiction over the user’s 
estate or his assets.149 
 
Enforcing forum selection and choice of law provisions in terms of 
service agreements may be contrary to public policy when the matter 
involves the estate proceeding of a deceased user. Courts have upheld 
forum selection and choice of law provisions in terms of service 
agreements, but these cases have primarily involved disputes between 
the user and custodian regarding the account services provided by the 
custodian.150 When the issue pertains to the settlement of an estate as 
in Ajemian, the decedent’s domicile is the appropriate forum and the 
laws of the domicile must be applied to resolve any questions 





145 Ajemian, 83 Mass. App. Ct. at 577. 
146 Id. at 579. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 Id.  
150 See, e.g., Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (enforcing 
forum selection clause contained in Facebook’s modified click-wrap agreement); 
Brodsky v. Match.com LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(enforcing forum selection clause in Match.com’s click-wrap agreement); Rojas-
Lozano v. Google, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106726 (D. Mass. 2015) (enforcing a 
forum selection clause contained in Google’s click-wrap agreement). But see Hines 
v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (declining to enforce 
forum selection clause contained in a browse-wrap agreement). 
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To deal with potential conflicts contained in terms of service 
agreements, Delaware law contains the following preemption clause 
which reads as follows:  
 
(c)  A choice-of-law provision in an end user license 
agreement is unenforceable against a fiduciary action 
under this chapter to the extent the provision designates 
law that enforces or would enforce a limitation on a 
fiduciary's access to or control over digital assets or 
digital accounts that is void under subsection (b) of this 
section.151 
 
Other states should follow Delaware’s lead and take affirmative steps 
to negate any forum selection or choice of law provisions contained in 
terms of service agreements being enforced against fiduciaries. In 
addition to including strong preemption language, each state 
legislature should incorporate language that makes it clear that the 
state’s own version of RUFADAA applies to a custodian if the user 
resides in the state or resided in this state at the time of the user’s 
death.152 Without these preventive measures, fiduciaries acting under 
the state’s authority face the possibility of litigation stemming from the 




RUFADAA attempts to clarify a fiduciary’s authority to deal with the 
digital assets of a deceased user, but certain issues still remain. 
RUFADAA should be revised to reflect the broader powers a fiduciary  
possesses with respect to non-protected digital assets. Spelling out 
these fiduciary powers in more detail would make it clear that 
fiduciaries are entitled to more than merely disclosure about the 
existence of decedent’s non-protected digital assets. Further, 
RUFADAA mandates that a custodian make available to a fiduciary 
any digital assets that do not include the content of electronic 





151 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 5004 (2019). 
152 See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS § 13-A-2.1(b). 
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to access non-protected digital assets should be severely limited. 
Finally, the states should block attempts by the custodians to override 
well-settled inheritance law that requires estate matters to be resolved 
in the state of the decedent's domicile. Forum selection and choice of 
law provisions in terms of service agreements should be unenforceable 
in matters involving inheritance, and the custodians should defer to 
each state’s own probate and succession laws to determine ownership 
and distribution of the assets and property of its domiciliaries. While 
significant progress has been made towards applying existing laws to 
fiduciaries dealing with digital assets, more work needs to be done to 
protect the property interests of deceased users.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
